The drive-by countries at all stages of development to update their information and communication networks has resulted in enormous demand for technology infrastructure. Across the globe, governments and businesses are investing billions of dollars to improve digital connection.
New 4G, 5G, satellites, and fiber-optic cable installations might provide great potential for host countries, but they could also offer substantial concerns if networks are created without proper protections. The United States has a role to play in protecting the internet and the global digital economy’s futures, but it will need to go beyond conflict with China in order to succeed.
The network effects in China
Digital access is the foundation for digital services that link communities to trade and financial resources, such as fintech and e-commerce. Startups in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa are attracting billions of dollars, but they need a robust and far-reaching information communications technology (ICT) backbone to thrive. China has become a key provider of ICT infrastructure nearly everywhere, thanks to its Digital Silk Road, Belt, and Road Space Information Corridor, and other state-led programs, particularly through subsidizing projects in less developed countries.
However, these investments come at a cost: cybersecurity and manipulation risks due to the Chinese government’s influence over its vendors. Due to legal commitments to the Chinese government, which include disclosing consumer data at the government’s request, China’s digital companies cannot promise that their customers will come first. Many companies also have internal Party groups that have a say in how decisions are made. Although the Communist Party of China (CPC) is not omnipotent — some corporations have been hesitant to comply with information demands – the CPC’s escalating assault on digital firms is limiting their capacity to defy directions.
Despite the political and security risks, many nations opt to source their technology from China since network modernisation is an economic requirement and Chinese enterprises typically offer cheaper costs than their worldwide counterparts. While the risks posed by companies like Huawei are not proof of collusion with the Chinese government, these legal and institutional pressures, combined with engineers’ record of accomplishment of spying for other countries’ governments, such as Uganda and Zambia, suggest that even China’s most powerful ICT companies could be co-opted. More types of data, ranging from personal conversations to financial, commercial, health, and other sensitive information, may become vulnerable to a “data trap” as the digital economy evolves and diversifies.
While state involvement is not assured, the CPC’s foreign policy strategy makes it more likely. Beijing wants worldwide audiences to adapt its aims and operations, thus it seeks “information dominance” to achieve that goal. Access to and influence over ICT infrastructure — the vehicle for modern communications — makes the companies that provide it pivotal to Chinese foreign policy. Data is important for understanding the information environment and shaping perceptions of the CPC, so access to and influence over it makes the companies that provide it pivotal to Chinese foreign policy.
Preference for CPC-friendly content and platforms results from information domination, limiting possibilities for local audiences. For example, China’s EXIM Bank provided hundreds of millions of dollars to StarTimes, a Beijing-based media business that updated and manages television networks in 30 African nations. It includes bandwidth dedicated to local viewpoints or media free of CPC propaganda in its cheapest subscriptions or even for free but excludes bandwidth dedicated to local perspectives or media free of CPC propaganda.
